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The Sociology of Knowledge as Post-Philosophical Epistemology: 
Out of IR’s ‘Socially Constructed’ Idealism  
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INANNA HAMATI-ATAYA 
Aberystwyth University 
 
 
 
This paper first aims to draw attention to, and diagnose, the failure of IR’s 
‘sociological turn’ to extend the domain of sociological reason into the 
philosophical turf of epistemology and thereby fulfill the full promises of the 
‘post-positivist turn’. Its second purpose is to revive and deploy the radical 
version of the sociology of knowledge that can achieve an autonomous 
reconstruction of epistemology suited to a reflexive, post-Kantian consciousness. 
The diagnosis begins by tracing the erasure of the radical sociological position in 
the connected evolutions of Sociology and IR. It shows that the derailing of the 
‘sociological revolution’ was paradoxically mediated by the consolidation of 
social constructionism and science studies, reproduced in IR through their 
counterparts in the ‘sociological turn’: Constructivism and the sociology of IR. In 
these otherwise reflexive developments the progression of sociological reason 
was halted by a self-imposed limitation on the extension of sociological analysis 
to all domains of thought, and the endorsement of an idealist and institutionalist 
ontology of ‘the social’. A reformulation of the forgotten, radical sociological 
position clarifies the implications for IR of a transition to a post-philosophical 
theory of knowledge, and delineates an empirical research agenda for such a 
reconstruction of epistemology driven by a sociology of knowledge of a 
‘revolutionary’ persuasion. Exploring the centrality of social practice in the social 
determination of knowledge, the paper argues that, and shows how, a properly 
reflexive reconstruction of epistemology is best achieved by deploying the 
sociology of knowledge in two complementary materialist directions: a sociology 
of everyday social practices that illuminates our epistemic immersion in the 
‘carpentered environments’ of the socio-natural order, and a sociology of craft 
that objectivates the social constitution of the skholè as a mode of existential 
boundedness by addressing scholarly thought as differentiated social labor. 
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Sociologizing IR: The ‘Turn’ That Tamed a ‘Revolution’ 
 
‘La science n’a pas la philosophie 
qu’elle mérite’. 
(Bachelard 1953, 20) 
 
‘Traditional philosophical epistemology… 
has come to the end of its road’. 
(Elias 1982, 36) 
 
 
Over the past few decades the field of International Relations (IR) has witnessed an 
important transformation driven by an awakening to the historicity and social-
situatedness of its knowledge, and the desire to inscribe this awareness into its theoretical 
and methodological frameworks, practice, and ethos. To date, the ‘sociological turn’ 
carrying this reflexive agenda has failed to coherently extend the domain and reach of the 
sociological understanding of knowledge to epistemology itself, thereby preserving and 
reproducing the classical division of intellectual labor between sociology and philosophy, 
whereby the understanding of the socio-historically contingent realities of knowledge and 
knowing has no bearing on the general epistemic categories and standards through which 
knowledge is defined, pursued, and evaluated.  
In endorsing what this paper will show to be an unsustainable division of labor, 
the sociological turn has in effect undermined the full extension and conclusive 
deployment of IR’s ‘post-positivist’ and reflexive consciousness, by impeding the advent 
of ‘the sociological revolution’: ‘the supersession of philosophy as such and the 
reformulation of the problems once generated there onto another level by sociology’ 
(Kilminster 1998, 15). In the case of epistemology this is manifested as a failure to 
reconstruct the ‘theory of knowledge’ as a ‘social theory’ proper: a general theoretical 
account of knowledge grounded in ‘epistemography’ (Dear 2001), that is, in an empirical 
investigation that takes the ontological status of knowledge seriously as a social 
phenomenon originating in the externality1 of social life, not in the imagined inner 
processes of an idealized universal mind.  
 While this paper focuses on epistemology, its implications extend to all domains 
falling within philosophy’s classical purview, including ontology and ethics. The wider 
issue of IR’s relation to philosophy – specifically, to its idealist-normative posture – 
pertains to our endorsement of philosophers’ self-definition as ‘conceptual trouble-
shooters, arriving on the doorstep of the sciences…with a conceptual toolkit ready to tune 
up their theories’ and ‘provide a rigorous, conceptual expertise in the interest of 
clarification’ (Kilminster 1998, 22). This peculiar, subordinated position that denies us 
our epistemic autonomy and autonomous judgment is widely accepted as an orthodoxy 
within IR, as recently exemplified in Patrick Jackson’s influential The Conduct of Inquiry 
(2011, 25) as well as in responses to it.  
Jackson’s intervention is heroic in its systematic deployment and stretching of the 
philosophical framework to accommodate all manifestations of IR’s ‘post-positivist’ and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I use the notions of ‘externality’ and ‘externalist’ analysis throughout as extensions of 
Durkheim’s conceptualization of social phenomena as being external both to the individual manifestations 
of consciousness, and to the mental/psychological processes of the mind (Durkheim 1894).  
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reflexive consciousness, including its growing sociological sensibility. But in buying into 
philosophy’s ‘clarifier role’ it fails to notice its breaking point. This paper travels the path 
to, and beyond, this point by delineating an alternative epistemology that properly 
embodies the critical and reconstructive potential of our newfound reflexivity. It thus 
challenges the notion that ‘the philosophy of IR’ is not part of ‘our main vocational task’ 
(Jackson 2011, 17) and thereby takes us a step closer to establishing ‘the philosophy that 
[we] deserve’ (Bachelard 1953, 20). 
The ‘philosophy’ we deserve is one whose categories and problematizations 
adequately reflect our current understanding of the social world and of our knowledge as 
an integral, dynamic part of that world; it is therefore a ‘philosophy’ that accompanies the 
socio-historical transformations of our epistemic consciousness and thereby transforms 
its own normative instruments on the basis of that evolving social history. Before such a 
recursive, existentially grounded, and autonomous process can replace the static, idealist, 
and heteronomous one currently defining the rules of our epistemic thought and conduct, 
philosophy and epistemology first have to be fully brought back into the social world to 
which they naturally belong.  
While IR’s ‘post-positivist’ turn was from the beginning informed by just such an 
intuition, the disjunction between this intuition and our continuing practice of turning to a 
priori philosophical standards to order and guide our understanding of knowledge, 
science, and theory (Hamati-Ataya 2016) has prevented a conclusive 
formulation/resolution of the problem of epistemic ‘foundations’ that the relativist, 
historicist critique has produced. In adopting a consistently naturalist perspective that 
focuses on epistemology as the domain that best crystallizes this disjunction, this paper 
aims to illustrate what it would mean to reclaim ‘the philosophy of IR’ as a coherent, 
autonomous, and critical endeavor, but also demonstrate that until this has been 
successfully achieved – in actual practice – the ‘post-positivist turn’ will remain 
incomplete, inconclusive, impotent, and harmful to our epistemic aspirations and social 
role. 
The paper advances these objectives in two steps. The first, ‘critical’ part begins 
with a diagnostic effort to trace the history and erasure of the radical sociological position 
on knowledge in the connected evolutions of Sociology and IR. My argument here is that 
the derailing of the ‘sociological revolution’ was paradoxically mediated by the 
consolidation of social constructionism and science studies, reproduced in IR by their 
counterparts in the sociological turn: Constructivism and the sociology of IR.  
In these otherwise reflexive developments the progression of sociological reason 
was halted by a dual process: 1) a self-imposed limitation on the systematic extension of 
sociological analysis to all products and levels of thought, which has prevented a re-
appropriation of epistemology as an object of sociological inquiry; 2) the endorsement of 
an idealist and institutionalist ontology of ‘the social’ that has undermined the original, 
bold ambition of the sociology of knowledge, namely, to explain the products of thought 
(including epistemology) as exogenously constituted in the material processes of social 
life.  
Following this analysis I reformulate the radical sociological position through the 
works of major theorists of the ‘social determination of knowledge’, and distinguish two 
pathways of social determination (social production and social differentiation) that 
produce epistemic consciousness through two kinds of ‘existential boundedness’ 
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(Seinsgebundenheit and Seinsverbundenheit). This allows me to both clarify the 
implications for IR of a transition to a post-philosophical theory of knowledge and define 
an empirical research agenda for such a reconstruction of epistemology driven by a 
sociology of knowledge of a ‘revolutionary’ persuasion. 
The second, ‘reconstructive’ part of the paper focuses on the latter objective by 
proposing a concrete research program that revives the legacy of social-determination 
theorists in the light of recent advances in sociological and philosophical research whose 
implications for epistemology have not systematically been explored as such. I first put 
forth social practice as the social phenomenon wherein the externalist and materialist 
parameters of the social-determination thesis converge and crystallize conceptually and 
empirically. Against current orientations in IR’s science studies and practice turns, I 
argue that empirical praxeology is the most cogent way of reconstructing epistemology 
instead of ignoring it.  
To demonstrate this, I develop in explicitly praxeological terms the two pathways 
of social determination previously discussed, and show how an empirically grounded 
sociological reconstruction of epistemology requires the deployment of the sociology of 
knowledge in two complementary materialist directions: 1) a sociology of everyday 
social practices that illuminates our epistemic immersion in the ‘carpentered 
environments’ of the socio-natural order, and 2) a sociology of ‘craft’ that objectivates 
the social constitution of the skholè as a specific mode of existential boundedness by 
addressing scholarly thought as differentiated social labor. 
In my concluding remarks, I situate this reconstructive project in the context of 
the shift from the ‘politics of truth’ to the politics of ‘untruth/post-truth’, which offers 
‘post-positivists’ the challenge and opportunity to interrogate their ability to coherently 
inscribe a social defense of ‘truth’ in a comprehensive understanding of its social nature 
and social conditions of possibility. 
 
The Sociology of Knowledge as Epistemology: On the Tracks of a Derailed 
Revolution 
 
Sociologists approach the ‘problem of knowledge’ by interrogating the socio-historical 
variability and contingency of all manifestations of thought, conceived as ‘cultural 
formations’ (Mannheim 1982, 55) and treated as ‘natural’ objects of reality (Bloor 1976). 
The objective of the sociology of knowledge is to identify and explain the social origins 
(ontogenesis), conditions of possibility, and processes of (re)production of our collective 
representations – (systems of) ideas, forms of thought, and modes of thinking.  
The first part of this paper explains why the division of labor between (the) 
sociology (of knowledge) and (the) philosophy (of knowledge/science) is untenable, by 
showing that the investigation of the ‘social determination of knowledge’2 in effect re-
appropriates the philosophical problem of ‘consciousness’ and of the origins of the 
‘forms’ and ‘categories of the Understanding’; and consequently, that a coherent, full 
deployment of the sociology of knowledge necessarily leads to a reconstruction of 
epistemology along post-philosophical lines.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Social determination’ doesn’t imply or entail ‘sociological determinism’. The ‘social 
determination of knowledge’ points to those origins of knowledge that are social, not to the idea that 
knowledge is exclusively socially determined. 
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To properly delineate and efficiently pursue such a project, however, requires to 
first understand how such a reconstruction failed to occur in IR and what self-imposed 
obstacles need to be removed for its achievement.  
 
The Social-Determination Thesis in Eclipse and the Taming of Sociological Reason 
 
The derailing of the radical inquiry into the social determination of knowledge started 
soon after the official establishment of the sociology of knowledge (as 
Wissenssoziologie) in Germany in the 1920s (Scheler 1980; Mannheim 1936) and 
unofficially in France (as sociologie de la connaissance) a couple of decades earlier 
(Durkheim 1960; Durkheim and Mauss 1970[1963]). While even Robert Merton 
recognized the foundational character of this problematic for a proper sociology of 
knowledge, his own contribution to the establishment and consolidation of the sociology 
of science, as a discipline focused on the institutional factors governing scientific 
organization and activity, led to the steady disappearance of the social-determination 
concern until the ‘constructionist turn’ in American social science. By the time this turn 
occurred, the sociology of knowledge had been relegated to a marginal space, delineated 
(i.e. excluded), on the one hand, by the philosophical-normative investigation of ‘justified 
true belief’ that constituted the domain of classical-analytical epistemology (Fogelin 
1994), and on the other, by the sociological investigation of ‘certified public knowledge’ 
as pursued by the then-dominant sociology of science (Merton 1973).  
The original concerns of the sociology of knowledge were thus narrowly and 
residually redefined in relation to what was excluded from the philosophical-
epistemological investigation of ‘truth’ and would justify a sociological approach, 
namely, ‘false knowledge’ or ‘opinion’, associated with the ‘theory of ideology’ broadly 
construed. Indeed the consensus was that only ‘false knowledge’, i.e. error, needed any 
sociological explanation, whereas ‘true knowledge’ required no grounding in social 
determinants, its validity being a sufficient explanation both of its occurrence and of 
‘correct’ beliefs about its truth-value. 
The constructionist turn of the 1960s provided the impetus for the re-emergence 
of the sociology of knowledge in the United States and the subsequent development of an 
anti-Mertonian sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) in the United Kingdom. Berger 
and Luckmann’s treatise (1991[1966]), which introduced the idiom of the ‘social 
construction of (social) reality’ through a synthesis of French (Durkheimian) and German 
(Weberian) sociological traditions, had a profound impact on the redefinition and 
subsequent trajectory of the field in Anglo-American sociology. Indeed it offered an 
explanatory framework that included social determination as part of the ‘co-constitution’ 
of subject and object, by reinstituting the origins of human representations as central to 
the investigation of social being and behavior.  
However, this American intervention differed in two important ways from the 
original European project. First, it focused on ‘everyday knowledge’ without a specific 
concern for scholarly knowledge. The then-dominant sociology of science, on the other 
hand, being exclusively interested in the ‘hard’ and technical sciences, this left social-
scientific and philosophical knowledge in an ontological vacuum that contrasted with its 
centrality for the original sociology of knowledge. Indeed the latter had envisaged itself 
as one instance of its object of study and was therefore conceived as an intrinsically 
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reflexivist program that could (and did) speak of its own social determination (Mannheim 
2000[1936]a).  
Second, the realm of reference for the social-determination thesis, namely, ‘the 
social’, was now defined in cultural-institutional and ideational ways, leaving out of ‘co-
constitution’ a whole set of material (ecological, biological, economic) and praxical3 
determinants of knowledge that were originally central to the sociology of knowledge. 
This ideationalist shift was consequential on two related levels. At the theoretical level, 
the explanation of ideational phenomena by other ideational phenomena distorted the 
externalist parameters of the sociology of knowledge, thereby undermining its original, 
distinctive purpose, which is to explain the formation and workings of consciousness as a 
socially (i.e. exogenously) constituted product, not map the interdependence of so-called 
‘inner’ products of consciousness in their social (external) manifestations. At the meta-
epistemological level, this shift inhibited the reconstructive potentialities of the 
sociological perspective, since there was no longer any reason to interrogate, let alone 
redefine, the standards of epistemology outside of those traditional idealist categories 
whose ‘origins’ could be a priori located in the realm of mental (internal) processes 
mediated by, and intersubjectively agreed upon via, other so-called products of 
consciousness: logic and language.  
Because social constructionism has affected all the social sciences, these related 
transformations have resulted in a taming of the ‘sociological revolution’ across the 
board, i.e. an erasure of its post-philosophical radicalism and self-acclaimed autonomy in 
matters of epistemology. Its failure to inform ‘critical’ and ‘reflexive’ scholarship is most 
strikingly illustrated by the fact that its most eloquent proponents – Marx (1978), Elias 
(1971a, b), Bourdieu (1983,1990a; Bourdieu et al. 1968) – are among the most influential 
sociologists and social theorists of the last century. How is it, then, that while even today 
Marxian, Eliasian, and Bourdieusian sociologies thrive, especially within ‘post-positivist’ 
(IR) circles, their passionate, even bellicose, anti-idealist/post-philosophical positions on 
epistemology are largely ignored?  
The ‘sociological revolution’ was deflated not so much by philosophers, who 
were taking stock of the philosophical ‘crisis’ provoked by advances in historical and 
social-scientific inquiry, but by sociologists who accepted and reasserted the traditional 
division of labor between the two disciplines – and this is where the lessons for IR begin 
to unfold. The taming of sociological radicalism was mediated by such authoritative 
interventions as Giddens’ (1984) The Constitution of Society and Berger and Luckmann’s 
own The Social Construction of Reality (1966): two seminal texts of Anglo-American 
sociology and the two bibles of Anglo-American constructionism.  
The earlier intervention sums up well the somewhat gratuitous reverence for 
philosophical inquiry and its ‘time-honoured intellectual territory’ (ontology and 
epistemology) characterizing the now-leading constructionist position – and to avoid any 
misunderstanding and outrage, it does so on the very first page of the book’s 
Introduction: with respect to questions about ‘the ultimate status’ of reality and 
knowledge, the sociologist’s ‘intrusion’ is  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3I use ‘praxical’ to refer to praxis/practice rather than to either practicality or practicability, for 
which I reserve the term ‘practical’. 
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likely to raise the eyebrows of the man in the street and even more likely to 
enrage the philosopher. It is, therefore, important that…we immediately disclaim 
any pretension to the effect that sociology has an answer to these ancient 
philosophical preoccupations. (Berger and Luckmann 1991[1966], 13) 
 
This was perhaps merely a cautious attempt by two Austrian-born scholars to pre-
empt well-rehearsed attacks on the sociology of knowledge, in a country that had just 
started to engage European ‘continental’ theories (many of which, like the Frankfurt 
School’s, were opposed to the project anyway), and where German Wissenssoziologie 
had found no philosophical allies besides Pragmatists who adopted a ‘genetic’ approach 
to knowledge (Lavine 1950, 538). But regardless of original intentions, these self-
imposed taboos on sociological thinking and critique prevailed, despite sociology’s 
natural vocation to ‘raise eyebrows’ precisely by challenging everyday commonsense, 
and despite such taboos’ nonsensical implications for other ‘ancient questions’ that fall 
within the ‘time-honoured intellectual territory’ of, say, metaphysical or theological 
inquiry. Not only were sociologists refused the legitimacy to answer ‘philosophical 
questions’ about knowledge and reality, the reverential posture also evaded the possibility 
that, as the realities of knowledge became illuminated sociologically and thereby made to 
recursively inform problematizations of knowledge and knowing, these ‘ancient’ 
questions would be rendered – or shown to always have been – properly meaningless. 
These two shifts operated by Anglo-American social constructionism – away 
from the critical inquiry into (social-)scientific and philosophical knowledge, and toward 
an idealist ontology of the social – are an extension of the ‘failure of nerve’ that David 
Bloor (1976) identified in Karl Mannheim’s own self-imposed limitations on the types of 
knowledge whose ‘truths’ Wissenssoziologie could (cultural sciences) and could not 
(physical and mathematical sciences, logic, epistemology) subject to sociological 
analysis. Both of these shifts – and, I suggest, a similar ‘failure of nerve’ – have played 
out in IR’s ‘sociological turn’ via Constructivism, but following two variants representing 
the diverging (Anglo-American vs. European) legacies of IR’s Constructivists.   
The two variants, sometimes identified as ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ versions of 
Constructivism (Hopf 1998), are easily differentiated by the extent to which they allow 
the reflexivity of ‘social actors’, as knowing subjects, to have epistemological 
implications for Constructivism itself. In ‘conventional Constructivism’, best represented 
by Alexander Wendt’s (1999) work, just as in Giddens’ and Berger and Luckmann’s, the 
sociology of knowledge is adopted as the scholar’s standpoint on other social actors’ 
knowledge, but not her own. The influential development of this peculiar version of the 
sociological turn prompted the affirmation of a ‘critical’ Constructivism that took a more 
coherent position on knowledge. In Stefano Guzzini’s (2000, 149) equally influential 
intervention, taking the sociological turn seriously entails problematizing ‘the 
relationship between the social world and the social construction of meaning (including 
[scholarly] knowledge)’.  
However, ‘critical’ Constructivism has so far limited the scope of this 
problematization in two significant ways. First, while coherently addressing the 
implications of the ‘social construction of meaning’ for our understanding of theory and 
its conceptual elements conceived as ‘intersubjective phenomena’ of ‘the social world’, it 
has not extended this same posture to epistemology and philosophy, which presumably 
	   8 
belong to the same class of ideational phenomena whose meaning is socially 
(intersubjectively) constructed. The failure to logically and critically take this one simple, 
additional step and carry the constructionist agenda empirically ‘all the way up’ has 
perhaps single-handedly delayed the formulation of a coherent post-foundationalist 
‘philosophy’ in IR. Second, the conceptualization of ‘the social’ in the two terms of the 
relationship – ‘the social world’ and the ‘social construction of meaning’ – is very clearly 
exclusive of material structures and processes (inanimate, biological, ecological, 
economic) that provide the stuff and the conditions of possibility of ‘social’ structures and 
processes, and thereby enable and mediate ‘social construction’.  
The final result is a social constructionism that doesn’t trickle its epistemology 
either up or down, and leaves the upper branches of ‘the social’ as unexplored as its deep 
roots. In complete opposition to the transgressive attitude of the original sociology of 
knowledge, ‘critical’ Constructivism rather appears as the product of a self-limiting 
boundary-work that keeps sociological critique gently within the (socially constructed) 
borders separating it from the sovereign realms of philosophy and the non-cultural 
sciences, and reproduces a (socially constructed) idealism that it denies itself the means 
of critically interrogating. 
The clearest illustration of ‘critical’ Constructivism’s softening of the sociology 
of knowledge is that it renders the latter barely distinguishable from alternative socio-
historical perspectives that now inform a growing ‘contextualist’ agenda within IR 
(Roshchin 2014), such as Nietzschean-Foucauldian, Skinnerian, and Koselleckian 
inquiries into the formation of IR thought/theory and its driving concepts (compare 
Bartelson (1995), Armitage (2000), Jahn (2006), Guzzini (2013), Ashworth (2014), 
Berenskoetter (2016)). Simultaneously, the contagious sociologizing gaze of the 
sociological turn has brought the discipline’s intellectual historians and historiographers 
so much closer to that ‘soft’ sociology of knowledge that they should rightly be 
considered an integral part of that turn. While this has undoubtedly widened and enriched 
the conversation about IR, the radicalism of the sociological perspective – its distinctive 
theoretical-explanatory ambitions, its aspirations for philosophical autonomy – has now 
been diluted in this sea of weakly differentiated contextualizing discourse. 
 The second path that has paradoxically contributed to the further erasure of the 
radical-sociological perspective in IR is the growing ‘science studies’ agenda. This 
agenda reflects the various influences of the sociology of science and, more recently, of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) as its heir and as the site of a reformulation of 
constructionism via ‘laboratory studies’. The first area of influence is manifested in IR 
scholars’ straightforward appropriation of STS’s subject-matter on the basis of its 
obvious importance in world politics (Mayer et al. 2014). The recent creation of a 
Science, Technology and Art in International Relations (STAIR) section at the 
International Studies Association marks the institutionalization of this agenda, which is 
confidently growing away from abstract epistemological debates.  
The second area of influence represents the reflexivist appeal of science studies 
insofar as they illuminate the realities of scholarly representations and practices for 
scholars themselves. Here, IR’s appropriation of STS’s theories and methodologies has 
required some extension of STS’s object-domain. Indeed STS’s core focus on the ‘hard’ 
and technical sciences (the founding case-studies being high-energy physics, molecular 
biology, and colloid chemistry), and its simultaneous translation of the social-
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constructionist interest in everyday knowledge into the everyday of ‘laboratory life’, have 
again left social-scientific and philosophical knowledge in an ontological vacuum. Even 
today, most sociological studies of that knowledge, such as the sociology of Philosophy 
(Collins 1998), the sociology of Sociology (Bourdieu 2001), the sociology of Economics 
(Fourcade 2009), and the sociology of IR, are at most (if at all) informed by STS 
scholarship but essentially developed outside of STS.  
In the case of IR, however (and as opposed to the sociology of Sociology), this 
appropriation endorsed the same narrowing of sociological and reflexivist inquiry that 
occurred in STS, where the facts about scholarly knowledge and practice have not 
triggered a redefinition of epistemology. The sociological research agenda that Ole 
Wæver proposed in his 1998 article has now crystallized as a somewhat constructionist 
version of a Mertonian sociology of IR-as-science, only more nuanced, and speaking the 
languages of the post-third-debate era wherein ‘criticality’ demands fluency in ‘post-
positivism’ and an engagement with gendered and (post-)colonial realities (a synthesis 
best achieved to date in Tickner and Wæver (2009) and Tickner and Blaney (2012)). 
Beyond its acknowledgment of the ‘critical’ canon, however, the ‘sociology of IR’ is 
increasingly anchoring the ‘sociological’ and ‘reflexive turns’ in the study of institutional 
structures and processes (made explicit in Grenier (2015)) ranging from academic 
interactions to publications, curricula, and public engagement (Hagmann and Biersteker 
2014; Kristensen 2015; Turton 2016; Grenier and Hagmann 2016; Alejandro 
forthcoming). Additionally, the sophisticated focus on scholars’ ‘practices’ underscoring 
this sociological project is explicitly promoted as a move away from IR’s traditional, 
unproductive obsessions with epistemology (Bueger 2012).  
Finally, STS’s influence in IR is unlikely to mediate a future engagement with the 
bolder ambitions of the sociology of knowledge. STS theorists’ move from social 
constructionism to the ‘co-production of nature and the social order’ (Jasanoff 
2006[2004]a), which manifests a ‘self-conscious desire to avoid both social and 
technoscientific determinism’ (Jasanoff 2006[2004]b, 20), does not provide any clear 
delineation of the social determination of knowledge. Co-production is understood in 
terms of ‘the ordering of nature through science and technology’ and ‘the ordering of 
society through power and culture’ (Jasanoff 2006[2004]b, 14; Miller 2006[2004], 65). 
This has diluted, in theory and practice, the investigation of different modalities of the 
recursive ordering of culture (including knowledge and thought). 
 Indeed a comprehensive account of the ‘co-production of nature and culture’ 
would address the natural (physiological, ecological) conditions and determinants of 
knowledge, and how social interaction and collective emotional and learning experiences 
in turn (re)shape the biological and genetic determinants of human cognition. A complete 
reflexivist ‘theory of knowledge’ would therefore encompass ‘natural/ized epistemology’ 
(Quine 1969) and ‘social/ized epistemology’ (Fuller 1988) conjointly. This paper focuses 
exclusively on the latter approach, while providing (in part two) some illustration of how 
the sociology of knowledge can incorporate elements of natural epistemology through a 
study of the socially transformed ecologies of human perception and understanding.  
The revival of the social-determination thesis is especially important because IR’s 
dominant versions of social constructionism have by and large reduced ‘the social’ to a 
free-floating realm of ‘the ideational’ (language, norms, identity, etc.), and material 
factors are ignored as necessary determinants of epistemic categories and representations. 
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Since this tendency extends to ‘post-positivist’ approaches more generally, we are 
basically left with the tacit paradigmatic proposition according to which the ideational 
begets the ideational – ideas produce more ideas, language shapes meanings and 
perceptions, culture informs norms… This, however, does not in any way explain why 
and how (any of these) ideational products are possible in the first place (the general 
formulation), or how macro-transformations in social organization and (re)production 
affect the frames through which social reality is intersubjectively rendered intelligible 
and meaningful (the specific formulation). And without such explanations being 
explicitly envisaged and systematically pursued, the sociology of knowledge is at best 
reduced to a mere sociologically inclined history of ideas.  
 
Epistemology as Social Theory: Theorizing Social Determination 
 
The sociological critique of philosophical epistemology began over 150 years ago. Before 
presenting it here it is useful to start with the ‘soft’ version of the sociology of 
knowledge, which has had the greatest impact on Western scholarship and IR, namely, 
Karl Mannheim’s4. Mannheim (1936, 56) defined Wissenssoziologie as the study of ‘total 
ideology’ understood as the ‘total structure of the mind’ of ‘an age or of a concrete 
historico-social group’. The sociology of knowledge reflexively explains itself as the 
concretization of the ‘historicist’ Weltanschauung (‘global outlook of an epoch’) 
(2000[1936]a, c), which reflects a maturation of the ‘unmasking turn of mind’ that 
characterizes sociological thought (2000[1936]a, 144). It originates in the realization that 
since ‘Weltanschauugen are not produced by thinking’, they should be subjected to an 
‘objective’ and ‘scientific’, rather than ‘idealist’, inquiry (2000[1936]b, 37-8). This 
inquiry is part of a broader ‘sociology of thought’ that entails ‘breaking through the 
immanence of thought – with an attempt to comprehend thought as a partial phenomenon 
within the broader field of existence, and to determine it, as it were, starting from 
existential data’ (2000[1936]a, 138).  
Mannheim’s study of conservatism demonstrates how ‘thinking is bound to 
existence’ (1986, 31), i.e. how knowledge and thought are 1) existentially bound 
(seinsgebunden) to the entire context of social production and socialization that 
determines their possibility, meaning, and truth-value, and 2) existentially connected 
(seinsverbunden) to specific social groups whose distinctiveness arises out of social 
differentiation. As opposed to Mannheim, radical sociologists deployed this analysis to 
include all types of knowledge and thought, tracking one or both of these two pathways 
of social determination in their furthest and most material extensions. This deployment 
entailed an explicit confrontation with philosophy, manifesting the self-conscious 
evolution of sociological thought following Auguste Comte’s ‘positive’ revolution.  
The Marxian-Engelsian critique of German idealism is one of the earliest 
formulations of the radical position. In The German Ideology Marx and Engels illustrate 
the posture exemplified by their ‘historical method’ in presenting the contents and forms 
of human consciousness as products in and of the processes of human material existence, 
defining ‘ideology’ as a socially produced distortion of our perception of reality: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Especially the influence of Ideology and Utopia on Carr, who ‘twisted its rhetorical structure 
almost out of recognition’ (Jones 2002, 236) and Morgenthau. 
	   11 
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they 
are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can 
never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their 
actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-
down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their 
physical life-process… (Marx and Engels 1978, 154) 
 
While ‘consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and 
remains so as long as men exist at all’ (1978, 158), what lends socio-epistemic power and 
credence to ideology is that the forms and modes of thinking through which ideas are 
posited as independently real, and consciousness as autonomous from social life-
processes, are themselves the (ideological) product of material existence, emerging when 
the division of social labor takes its ultimate form, that is, once manual and mental labor 
become separated in the process of production: 
 
From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is 
something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents 
something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in 
a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 
“pure” theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. (1978, 159). 
 
In Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, and beyond it, of all products of mental 
labor, the materialist posture is crystallized in the now-paradigmatic thesis according to 
which the ‘mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and 
intellectual life process in general’ and hence that ‘[i]t is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but on the contrary their social being that determines their 
consciousness’ (Marx 1978, 4).  
The original excerpts were worth reproducing here to remind the reader that the 
Marxian critique of ‘ideology’ applies to the entire process and phenomenon of ideation. 
Its implications for epistemology are best captured by the analysis of the origins of 
abstract and conceptual thought, as delineated by George Thomson (1977[1955]) in The 
First Philosophers and pursued by Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978) in his Intellectual and 
Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology. 
Thomson (1977[1955], 300) noted that  
 
[a]s we pass from Thales to Anaximander and Anaximenes, from the Milesians to 
Pythagoras and Herakleitos and finally to Parmenides, we find the concept of 
matter becoming progressively less qualitative and concrete, until Parmenides 
confronts us with a pure abstraction, timeless and absolute.  
 
Remarking that ‘the society in which these philosophers lived and worked was 
characterized by the rapid growth of a monetary economy’, Thomson proposed that ‘[t]he 
Parmenidean One, together with the later idea of “substance,” may therefore be described 
as a reflex or projection of the substance of exchange value’ (1977[1955], 300, 301). 
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Sohn-Rethel (1978, 2010[1961]) systematically explored this hypothesis with 
respect to the history of philosophy up to Kant and the birth of modern science. Drawing 
on Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism, Sohn-Rethel replaced Marx’s concepts of 
‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’ with those of ‘use-activity’ and ‘exchange-activity’. In 
commodity production and circulation the two types of activity (i.e. practice) are 
separated in time and space, the marketplace being a transitory realm between production 
and use wherein the exchange-value of commodities takes precedence over their use-
value. Once commodities are no longer exchanged for one another through barter but via 
a ‘universal equivalent’ (money), abstraction becomes a defining component of men’s 
social relations. In causally connecting the birth of abstract thought to that of ‘exchange-
abstraction’ and the emergence of the concept of ‘movement’ in Galilean Physics to the 
movement of monetary circulation, Sohn-Rethel illustrates how it is in humans’ practice, 
not in their thought, that theoretical forms and categories originate: 
 
[O]ur concepts…are not properties of things that…we would read in them. Quite 
the contrary, the conceptual apparatus that we apply to things is part of us, but this 
‘part of us’ is to be understood in both a social and historical sense; it is not 
individual, and it does not come from nature…[T]hese pure concepts…are related 
to the conscious elimination of society in the act of thinking…they are…that 
which remains once one has completely abstracted the social (2010[1961], 40)5.  
 
 The conclusion that idealist-philosophical epistemology is the product of a social 
process whereby the social nature and externality of consciousness are made invisible to 
consciousness was also established in Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss’ functionalist 
analysis of collective representations. Their 1903 study of ‘primitive forms of 
classification’ (1970[1963]) laid the ground for a realist understanding of the social 
origins and constitution of philosophical ‘categories’ such as time and space. These were 
shown to result from the ordering of the world that is produced in the course of a social 
group’s interaction with nature and the organization of its physical environment and 
everyday activity.  
Crucially, in Durkheim’s (1960) study of the ‘elementary forms of religious life’, 
based on ethnographies of totemic Australian societies, the philosophers’ category of 
‘category’ is itself appropriated sociologically and subjected to a naturalist analysis. By 
illuminating the logic and process according to which humans, animals, and inanimate 
objects are brought together into totemic groups, Durkheim shows that while the act of 
classifying implies the human faculty to classify, i.e. establish relations of ‘resemblances’ 
and ‘identity’ among things, the principle according to which these associations are made 
is completely external to consciousness: it is the social organization of the group that 
provides the ‘model’ for a conceptual ordered grouping wherein items are placed in a 
relation of ‘parenthood’ vis-à-vis one another (1960, 200-222). Durkheim’s analysis thus 
demonstrates the determining role of social organization and practice in the emergence 
and socio-mental fixation of intersubjective epistemic categories within society and in 
each of its members’ mind.  
Durkheim’s study further demonstrates ‘how the most diverse techniques and 
practices (law, morality, arts) and those that serve material life (sciences of nature, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Quotes from French sources are translations by the author throughout. 
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industrial techniques) are, directly or indirectly’ derived from religious practice and 
thought and inherit its original forms (1960, 319-320). The meta-epistemological 
implications of the erasure of this genealogy in the constitution of philosophical and 
(social-)scientific thought are most strikingly illustrated in his analysis of the concepts of 
‘force’ (and by extension, ‘power’) (1960, 268-292) and ‘causality’ (1960, 501-528) – 
another a priori category of Kantian philosophy – whose origins are identified, 
respectively, in the magical representations of totemism and in the practices of ‘mimetic’ 
(or ‘imitative’) totemic rituals.  
 The radical sociological position finds another powerful formulation in Max 
Scheler’s phenomenological contribution, which is the first explicit demarcation of the 
sociology of knowledge as an autonomous discipline, and the first systematic, 
comprehensive sociological treatment of ‘the problem of knowledge’. The sociology of 
knowledge is here again asserted against philosophy’s idealism (Scheler 1980, 38), being 
conceived as the investigation of the ‘temporal coming-to-be’ of ‘ideal factors’ that 
constitute the domain of culture (‘religion, metaphysics, science, art, and law’) on the 
basis of the ‘relationships and forms’ of ‘real factors’ of social life, the most important of 
which are the economy, power, and reproduction (1980, 36).  
It is impossible to capture the extraordinary sophistication, vision, and scope of 
Scheler’s enterprise in a few paragraphs, but its core propositions are clear enough for the 
purpose at hand. For Scheler, different types of knowledge have different origins and are 
‘carried’ by different social groups and their associated ‘ethos’. They are all constituted 
by the effects of diverse material causes, starting from natural factors associated with a 
universal ‘innate drive impulse’ to ‘construct and play’ that is released by ‘[e]verything 
unfamiliar…that disrupts the context of immediate, interconnected anticipations’ (1980, 
77). Two layers of social factors explain the differentiation of epistemic standpoints and 
their constitutive intellectual orientations. These factors are related to humans’ interaction 
with their environment and to their socio-economic organization.  
Scheler assigns the most significant impact of socio-ecological factors on the 
differentiated cultural evolution of metaphysics, wherein differences in perspectives 
reflect different existential immersions in the world, which produce specific conceptions 
of the ‘self’ and of how ‘self’ and ‘world’ are related to each other. Whereas ‘Asian 
Indian metaphysics is one of “forests”…, one of immediate contact with nature, of 
identification with and immersion of the soul in life,…by contrast almost the entire 
metaphysics of the West is a product of city thinking’. While the former thereby produces 
an ‘almost metaphysical-democratic conscious unity of man with all sub-human life’, the 
latter translates as a consciousness wherein ‘man’ views himself as ‘a sovereign being 
above all of nature’ (1980, 98). It is within such metaphysical schisms that socio-
economic factors operate as a third source of external determination, explaining 
differences in content and form among Western philosophies (French, British, German) 
as deriving from the characteristics and ethos of the social groups that produced them 
(respectively, the ‘enlightened nobility’, the ‘larger bourgeoisie…[of] statesmen and 
economists’, and ‘the learned Protestant middleclass’) (1980, 98-99).  
But social determination operates along different pathways that reflect the social 
differentiation of mental and manual labor. The social determination of philosophy is 
mediated by ‘the work of learned people of the upper classes who have the leisure to 
contemplate essences and to devote themselves to their own “cultivation”’ (1980, 100). 
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While this existential distance from the material processes of social life is necessary and 
sufficient for the development of ‘metaphysical knowledge’, it cannot, however, account 
for the emergence of ‘positive knowledge’, whose ‘basic sociological origins’ are ‘always 
economic communities of work and commerce’. Science originates in the ethos of those 
whose immersion in the life-process shapes their consciousness and ‘inner drive’ in the 
direction of an ‘intensive interest in those images of and thought about nature that make 
possible the prediction of natural processes and control over them’. This is the ‘class of 
people who have accumulated experience in work and crafts’, and without whose praxis 
‘science never would have found its essential and close connection with technology, 
measurement, and, later on, free experiment’ (1980, 100).  
Insofar as science is the meeting of theoretical and practical knowledge, it is 
always and everywhere ‘the child of the marriage between philosophy and work-
experience’ (1980, 100-101). But against the ‘learned’ classes’ idealist epistemology, the 
sociology of knowledge illuminates the praxical nature and becoming of science: 
 
technology is not a subsequent ‘application’ of a theoretical, contemplative 
science characterized by the idea of truth, observation, conservation, pure logic, 
and mathematics; rather, the more or less prevailing will to control and direct this 
or that realm of existence (gods, souls, society, organic and inorganic nature) co-
determines the methods of thought and intuition, as well as the goals of scientific 
thought, and, indeed, it co-determines as though behind the back of the 
consciousness of individuals, whose changing motivations for investigation do not 
matter in this process. (Scheler 1980, 101). 
 
In Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’ 
(1989) the socio-historical differentiation of social labor and the consequent social 
constitution of theoretical thought are further specified as being mediated and 
consecrated by the constitution of a social group whose worldview is shaped by a specific 
mode of existential boundedness – the skholè – that is exemplified, (re)produced, and 
legitimated through a socially organized and institutionally validated collective practice, 
intersubjectively experienced as a distinctive vocation and ethos:  
 
The scholastic view is a very peculiar point of view [on the world]…that is made 
possible by the situation of skholè, of leisure, of which the school…is a particular 
form, as an institutionalized situation of studious leisure. Adopting this scholastic 
point of view is the admission fee, the custom right tacitly demanded by all 
scholarly fields… (Bourdieu 1990a, 381).  
 
Insofar as what ‘those whose profession it is to think and/or speak about the world 
have the most chance of overlooking are the social presuppositions that are inscribed in 
the scholastic point of view’, reflexivity entails interrogating ‘the social conditions of 
possibility’ of this collective standpoint and ‘the unconscious dispositions, productive of 
unconscious theses, which are acquired through an academic or scholastic experience, 
often inscribed in prolongation of an originary (bourgeois) experience of distance from 
the world and from the urgency of necessity’ (1990a, 381). Therefore – and as a final 
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sociological explanation of the division of intellectual labor between sociology and 
philosophy –   
 
[w]e must, by taking historicist reduction to its logical conclusion, seek the 
origins of reason not in a human “faculty,” that is, a nature, but in the very history 
of these peculiar social microcosms in which agents struggle, in the name of the 
universal, for the legitimate monopoly over the universal, and in the progressive 
institutionalization of a dialogical language which owes its seemingly intrinsic 
properties to the social conditions of its genesis and of its utilization. (1990a, 389) 
 
This overview of the radical sociological position brought out the centrality of 
social practices in the theorization of social determination. Before developing this 
position into an empirical research agenda that further explores the two pathways of 
social determination (social production and social differentiation) that constitute 
collective consciousness as dually ‘existentially bounded’ (seinsgebunden and 
seinsverbunden), it is important to spell out its implications for a critique and 
reconstruction of epistemology in IR.  
 
Implications for IR: Problematizing Knowledge Before IR Theory, Above the Philosophy 
of Science 
  
If the sociology of knowledge necessarily disturbs the foundations of classical 
epistemology, it is because it naturally constitutes itself as an alternative perspective on 
the philosophical ‘categories’ and ‘universals’. First, because it does not take for granted 
the first assumptions through which philosophy operates as a prism (the ‘clarifier’ role) 
or a foundation (the ‘arbiter’ role) for all fields of inquiry. As Mannheim puts it, while 
 
philosophy tends to ground itself upon a timeless and unchanging reason, or at 
least to presuppose the unchangeability of the formal determinants of reason 
(especially of the categories), the sociology of knowledge, as an empirical 
specialised science, is not allowed to accept such a postulate as binding upon 
itself. These problems are questions for its factual inquiries (Mannheim 1986, 33; 
italics added).  
 
The implications of this statement were clear for Mannheim (2000[1936]a) regardless of 
his shyness about them: as the sociology of knowledge pursues its project empirically and 
brings to light the social determination of ‘the categories’ themselves, it simultaneously 
delineates an alternative epistemology – one which, as opposed to philosophical 
epistemology, is constituted from the bottom up and from the outside in.  
Consequently, as Durkheim demonstrates, a sociological approach to collective 
representations brings philosophy itself into the object-domain of the sociology of 
knowledge. This is best exemplified with respect to the debate between philosophical 
empiricists and rationalists about the origins of ‘the categories’ themselves – a debate that 
the sociological approach resolves by explaining its occurrence and the dualism of its 
form. To claim that the ‘categories’ are the product of pure experience (empiricism) is to 
ignore their ‘universality’ and ‘necessity’, i.e. the fact that one cannot willfully escape 
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from them and reinvent them as one wishes. But to claim that they are innate and external 
to all experience (rationalism) is to place them outside of objective reality: the concept of 
a ‘universal reason’ really does not answer the question about the origins of these 
categories, or account for their variability across time. It is, rather, their ‘social character’ 
that explains their ‘necessity’, and hence their ‘objectivity’ as grounded in ‘the [social] 
nature of things’ (Durkheim 1960, 23-4).  
The sociological perspective thus highlights the fact that by separating ‘the 
product of thinking’ from its ‘sociological genesis’ and consequently anchoring 
epistemology in ‘the level of immanent entities’ (Mannheim 1986, 31) the idealist-
philosophical approach merely confuses ontological ‘objectivity’ with ‘timelessness’ 
(Mannheim 1982, 74) and thereby completely misses the nature, origins, and causes of 
objectivity. If the ‘categories’ are both universal and contingent, it is because they are – 
exactly, no more, no less – socio-historically objective. This, IR scholars of a ‘post-
positivist’ persuasion have accepted as a reasonable proposition with respect to theories 
and statements about the world, but somehow the implications of the principles of social-
constructedness and historicity have never sufficiently ‘trickled up’ to affect the 
philosophical frameworks that in turn govern IR’s meta-theoretical discussions.   
 The more profound implications for IR, then, concern the ontological and 
epistemological ‘universals’ that anchor our authority to speak about the world: those 
pertaining to the world’s existence and nature, and to our modes of knowing it. These 
include but precede any discussions and debates we might have about ‘the international’ 
or whatever constitutes our subject-matter. In other words, the ‘problem of knowledge’ 
cannot be addressed (e.g. EJIR 2013) at the level of (better) IR theories or in the 
intertextual spaces of their agreements or oppositions, because the social determinants of 
thought have already affected the frameworks through which theories are constituted, 
rendered meaningful, and debated. It is therefore not merely insufficient, but actually 
counter-productive, to mobilize the sociology of knowledge for an epistemological 
‘reconstruction’ of IR theories and concepts (Guzzini 2000) without first deploying it for 
a meta-epistemological reconstruction of epistemology itself. And it is in this sense that 
the ‘sociological turn’ carried by ‘critical Constructivism’ has a paradoxical sabotaging 
effect despite its reflexive purpose and character.  
Nor, then, can the problem be addressed (e.g. Jackson 2011), even less so 
resolved, within/through the philosophy of science, until the social determinants of its 
categories and validating standards have been rigorously exposed and critically 
interrogated, so they can become truly meaningful and useful as socio-cognitive 
instruments. But this, of course, would produce a very different ‘philosophy’ for IR than 
the one we’ve been following for a century now: a new philosophy manifesting and 
translating the historical (i.e. cumulative and self-corrective) progression of sociological 
reason, that is, the philosophy of a non-self-deceiving ‘autonomy’ suited to a properly 
post-Kantian consciousness. 
To sum up, the superiority of the sociological position lies in its ability to engage 
the problem of knowledge at the meta-philosophical level and thereby coherently 
reconcile objectivity and historicity, by explaining the appearances of universality as 
manifestations of the contingently objectivizing effect of social determination. Crucially, 
it also identifies the social process whereby such appearances gain the socio-
epistemological credibility of their objectivity, namely, the praxically mediated social 
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constitution of theoretical thought. This is the central thread running through the 
perspectives presented above, and it is by exploring it systematically and empirically that 
we can achieve a reconstruction of epistemology in IR.  
The second part of this paper accordingly moves on to an elaboration of the 
requisites for such a reconstruction. The question of IR’s ‘categories’ is here addressed in 
the terms that befit a meta-epistemological inquiry concerned, not with specific theories 
and objects, but with the modes and frames of knowing that mediate and enable scholarly 
knowledge and its distinctive standpoint on the world.  
 
Practice as Mediation and Site of the Social: Outline for a Praxiographic 
Investigation of Scholarly Thought 
 
As shown earlier, practice emerges as the social phenomenon wherein the theoretical and 
ontological concerns of the social-determination thesis converge and crystallize, thereby 
delineating a path for a further exploration of that thesis. Conceptually practice connects, 
and simultaneously transcends the dichotomies of, the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’, the 
‘social’ and the ‘individual’, the ‘material’ and the ‘ideational’. It can thus be understood 
as that which mediates between the socio-natural order and human consciousness. 
Consequently and methodologically, practice can be treated as the site of the social in the 
individual, and hence provides an anchoring for actual empirical research, i.e. for a 
‘praxiography’ specifically (Mol 2002 – see also Bueger 2014).  
However, contra the dominant orientation in the sociology of IR, the sociological 
study of collective consciousness presented above indicates that scientific and academic 
practices are not the only or most relevant social practices to explore, even for the 
investigation of philosophical and social-scientific knowledge. The following sections 
propose a more adequate and comprehensive approach that reflects a deeper engagement 
with the meta-epistemological significance of praxeology. 
 
Praxeology 
 
Keeping in mind the various ways that ‘praxis’ and ‘practice(s)’ are conceptualized 
(Bueger and Gadinger 2014; Kustermans 2016), this section outlines core tenets of the 
praxeological approach that are directly relevant to the problem at hand and that open up 
a different space for the ‘practice turn’. While some pioneers of this turn in IR explicitly 
envisage it as a move away ‘from epistemology to practice’ (Bueger 2012) – thereby 
enabling the ‘sociological turn’ as the saboteur of the ‘sociological revolution’ – my 
argument is that praxeology is actually a means for redefining epistemology 
sociologically, and that it is the most efficient (and potentially the only) means for doing 
so in an empirically conclusive manner.  
This different take on praxeology implies a reversal of the relation between 
knowledge and practice: instead of practices being merely conceived as manifestations 
that ‘embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on 
the material world’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4), they are here (also, but mainly) 
understood as manifestations that embody and mediate the expression of the material 
world in and through the actualization of knowledge. Within this framing, praxeology 
carries distinctive positions that are especially relevant to an epistemography of IR. 
	   18 
First, practice theorists endorse a materialism that focuses on the body as ‘the 
meeting point both of mind and activity and of individual activity and social manifold’ 
(Schatzki 2001, 8). This reverses the idealism of classical epistemology: 
 
This prioritization of practices over mind brings with it a transformed conception 
of knowledge…[K]nowledge (and truth) are no longer automatically self-
transparent possessions of minds. Rather, knowledge and truth, including the 
scientific versions, are mediated both by interactions between people and by 
arrangements in the world…Scientific and other knowledges also no longer 
amount to stockpiled representations. Not only do practical understandings, ways 
of proceeding, and even setups of the material environment represent forms of 
knowledge – propositional knowledge presupposes and depends on them. 
(Schatzki 2001, 12) 
 
Second, this entails acknowledging the two performative dimensions of practice. 
Practice should not only be conceived as a more or less passive performance of collective 
representations that offers the observer an insight into individuals’ immersion in the 
social order to whose structural reproduction they contribute. It should be understood 
simultaneously as the medium of an active response to macro-structural processes of 
social life, and the locus of a micro-resistance to social structures and dynamics of order, 
discipline, and control (de Certeau 1990[1980]). A non-individualist investigation of 
individuals’ practices can therefore capture, in their reproductive and subversive 
dimensions, the overall social dynamics of collective order-(re)making.  
Praxiography offers an insight into these social dynamics that is unmediated and 
hence unobstructed by the layers of meaning we constantly produce in our intellectual 
and moral engagement with the social order, and that render our objective grounding in it 
more opaque to the observer. A praxiographic investigation of social determination 
therefore provides a fruitful alternative to the contextual-discursive analysis – as 
practiced by historians of ideas – of such hyper-disciplined and overly constructed 
material as scholarly texts. It thereby constitutes an apt application of Mannheim’s 
(2000[1936]b, 38-39) principle for the ‘unmasking’ of Weltanschauugen, since it avoids 
the trap of starting from their ‘most remote manifestations’, i.e. the forms wherein they 
are already-theorized and over-rationalized, and hence most ‘masked’.  
With these points in mind, each of the following sections explores one of the two 
pathways of social determination identified by social-determination theorists, with a view 
of formulating an empirical research agenda for a reconstruction of epistemology driven 
by a sociology of knowledge of a ‘revolutionary’ persuasion. In each section I develop 
my position against the backdrop of dominant praxeological and philosophical 
perspectives to make explicit the shifts it entails. 
 
From ‘Laboratory Life’ to ‘Everyday Life’ 
 
The epistemological tenets of social constructionism and the methodological tenets of 
praxiography emerged, as intrinsically co-constitutive, out of ‘laboratory studies’ (Latour 
and Woolgar 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Zenzen and Restivo 1982; Lynch 1985; Traweek 
1988). Laboratory studies operated a series of interrelated, salutary moves vis-à-vis 
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classical history and philosophy of science: from an abstract universal model of Science 
to the realities of actual, evolving sciences; from historical, stock-taking analyses of 
‘established knowledge’ and ‘already-made science’ to contemporaneous studies of 
‘unfinished knowledge’ and ‘science in action’; from the normative evaluation of 
scientific propositions via a priori standards of truth and validity to the investigation of 
the social formation of these standards in scientific activity; and consequently, from a 
focus on ‘the context of justification’ to a focus on ‘the context of discovery’ and the 
actual relations between them. The laboratory provided a temporal and spatial 
localization for which ethnographic observation became the method to investigate ‘the 
construction of knowledge’ and subsequently ‘the construction of the machineries of 
knowledge construction’ (Knorr-Cetina 1999, 3). From there, historical analysis was re-
introduced by extending the ethnographic method from the unmediated observation of 
contemporaneous scientific activity to the reconstitution of past socio-scientific processes 
of truth-making (Shapin and Schaffer 1985).  
 Although laboratory studies have originally been applied to the (experimental) 
‘hard’ sciences, there are no fundamental restrictions on their extension to the social 
sciences and humanities. This merely requires adapting localization to the physical, 
relational, institutional, and discursive spaces wherein scholarly practices are conducted 
and enacted – the field, the office, the classroom, the conference, the home, as well as 
loci of debate, controversy, and myth-making, or the sites where authority, recognition, 
and discipline are performed. The tradition of scholars writing about their practices 
autobiographically or drawing on them to advise on the ‘craft’ of intellectual and 
academic life (Mills 2000[1959], Becker 2007[1986], Wildavsky 2010[1993]) is merely 
an informal, under-theorized version of such a ‘laboratory’ approach to our most 
consciously (individually) performed practices. Today it has become theorized and 
extended to a range of collective ones (Friese 2001; Lamont 2009). This illustrates the 
perfect feasibility and pertinence of laboratory studies for IR. 
What requires consideration, however, is the kind of practices that need to be 
investigated if the objective is to capture not merely what scholars do that underscores the 
construction of facts and truths, but the very categories of thought that make such 
knowledge possible and affect its contents, forms, and credibility. While laboratory 
studies do consider the connections that extend the laboratory’s realm of practice into its 
social environment, they are fundamentally interested in science and science-relevant 
practices, and localization is conceived in terms that serve that specific purpose. This 
focal center makes them distinctive qua praxiographies of science, which enables 
comparisons with other, similarly conceived ‘communities of practice’ (diplomats, NGO 
workers, etc.).  
My argument, then, is that against the dominant approach inspired by laboratory 
studies, the sociology of knowledge qua alternative epistemology requires an expansion 
toward those social practices that are not specifically scientific or academic. This follows 
naturally from the conception that scholarly knowledge is a sub-species of human culture, 
that is also embedded in, and carried by, other sub-species of culture, and that the social 
determination at work in the production of cultural categories is best understood by 
examining those social structures, processes, and practices that precede, enable, and 
mediate scholars’ socialization into scholarly thought and practice ‘proper’. The first step 
required to advance a praxiographic investigation of the social-determination thesis is 
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therefore a move from ‘laboratory life’ to ‘everyday life’ that, contra Berger and 
Luckmann, refocuses attention on scholarly knowledges.  
The study of everyday life is a well-established cross-disciplinary research 
program that already informs analyses of international politics and practices (Guillaume 
2011; Acuto 2014; Davies and Niemann 2017). It has, however, not yet affected the 
investigation of IR itself, occupying at best an informal discursive space in IR scholars’ 
private conversations and autobiographical accounts. My purpose is not to systematize or 
generalize such anecdotal insights as they pertain to IR as a profession, but rather to 
elevate the issue to the meta-epistemological problem concerning the mental patterns, 
categories, and ontologies that frame IR knowledge itself. The next step, then, is to 
identify those everyday practices that carry the mediation of the social order into 
collective consciousness. This reflects a choice of explanatory variables for the 
investigation of the social-determination thesis, and the following discussion cannot be 
exhaustive of all variables and hypotheses. It focuses specifically on how scholars’ 
immersion in more or less, and differently, ‘carpentered environments’ shapes their 
epistemic imagination and relation to the world (Seinsgebundenheit).  
The notion of a ‘carpentered world’ originates in anthropological and 
psychological research on ethno-cultural differences in human perception. Positive 
empirical testing of this hypothesis suggests that people in different cultures are 
‘differentially susceptible’ to such pictorial representations as geometric illusions 
‘because they have learned different, but always ecologically valid, visual inference 
habits’ (Segall et al. 1966). For a historicist, historical-materialist, functionalist, 
phenomenological, or structuralist-constructivist approach, this is of significant 
importance in highlighting the impact of social structures and organization on the 
constitution of the categories of ordinary and scientific understanding, since it refers to 
the differentiated evolution of socially transformed landscapes in more or less urbanized, 
industrialized societies.  
In his phenomenological-hermeneutic study of space-perception Patrick Heelan 
(1983) specifically shows how such an evolution in the material culture and artifacts of 
European society was a precondition for the internalization and normalization of the 
Cartesian/Euclidean organization of visual space that was central to the subsequent 
establishment and legitimation of the modern scientific perspective. The carpentered 
environment we create in the process of social existence praxically mediates our 
perception of the world (our ontology), and is hence constitutive of (the validity of) our 
knowledge of it (our epistemology).  
Insofar as it pertains to the macro-organization of social space and the social 
transformation of our ecologically mediated perception of the world, the carpentered 
environment is especially relevant to the further exploration of theses concerning 
variations in patterns and modes of thought along the spectral differentiation of forms of 
social organization or modes of (re)production, and of their respective world-forms –
urban/rural, agricultural/industrial/post-industrial, sedentary/nomadic, etc. Studies of 
everyday ‘spatial practices’ in the modern city, for example, explore how its man-made 
spaces, structures, dimensionalities, and grids create specific perspectives, rhythms, and 
modes of engagement with the world, observable in a range of visual, discursive, and 
kinetic practices of everyday life and their associated representations, ‘texts’, and 
technologies. 
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The paradigm of ‘vision’ that dominates Western modern science can thus be 
interpreted in relation to the constitution of our cognitive frames of seeing as shaped by 
the spatial parameters of the modern urban landscape: the ‘god trick’ of ultimate vision 
that underscores science’s claim to objectivity (Haraway 1988) is merely an anticipatory 
celebration of the fulfillment of the Icarian phantasm, now fully experienced from the top 
of metropolises’ elevated megastructures (de Certeau 1990[1980], Chap. 7), and from the 
flying machines that connect them through the open, gridded skies that have replaced the 
metaphorical seat of the godly perspective. 
Such analyses call for systematic comparisons of how frames of seeing vary in 
differently configured – i.e. differently ‘carpentered’6 – spaces, both urban and rural (e.g. 
Bourdieu’s ethnography of the Kabyle house (2000[1972], Chap. 2)). How, for example, 
does the urban environment – with its Euclidean spatial organization, its patterned 
movements along rigidified grids of linear streets, strategically positioned traffic lights, 
symmetrical staircases of equally elevated steps, and webs of connective metro lines, and 
its excessively anthropic and technical-material aesthetics – affect our frames of seeing 
and knowing differently than do rural environments or the (hyperbolically organized) 
‘natural’ ones? How do these different ecologies and their spatial carpentries shape one’s 
epistemic imagination, i.e. the patterns, objects, and pathways of our thought-processes?  
A comparative praxiography of knowledge produced within global IR would 
consider how the way we existentially and praxically inhabit differently carpentered 
environments along the spectrum of populated socio-ecological landscapes affects our 
theoretical, meta-theoretical, praxical, and practical engagement with our objects of 
study, from ‘the international’ and ‘the global’ to our conceptions of ‘order’, ‘territory’, 
‘space’ and ‘borders’, but also what shapes epistemic dispositions and preferences for 
patterns and regularities, analytical or normative thinking, closed systems, 
anthropocentrism, modeling, longue-durée perspectives, processual and structural 
explanations, or a focus on ‘agents’ rather than ‘forces’...  
This angle creates a very different ‘contextualization’ of IR knowledge than either 
the geoepistemic one informed by postcolonial realities and ethno-cultural differences 
between and within ‘core and periphery’ scholarship, or the socio-historically informed 
comparative genealogies of classical and contemporary discourses on the world that 
contextualizes them in relation to the Zeitgeist, institutions, and problem-constellations of 
their time and place. Indeed an engagement with, say, ‘classical’ Chinese and Greek, or 
medieval and ‘Enlightenment’ European political thought should take into account 
transformations in the larger, material-ecological structuration of consciousness and 
theoretical thinking that such genealogies ignore or assume to be unchanging. 
This approach, however, can be more systematically and comprehensively 
investigated if the notion of a ‘carpentered environment’ is made relevant to other 
‘categories’ beside space – i.e. expanded to the full ‘carpentry’ of everyday life. This 
includes the rhythms and motifs (routinized or open-ended) of private and public time 
and their technologies and practices (clocks, schedules, calendars; timetabling and time-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6I abstract the notion of ‘carpentry’ from its wooden materiality (in terms of substance and the 
specific forms/structures this substance enables) and use it as a general metaphor for the architectural 
configurations of our environments (both natural and man-made). Consequently, ‘carpentered 
environments’ encompass all ‘worlds’, not only ‘carpentered worlds’ as defined by Segall et al. This shifts 
the analytical focus to how environments are differently configured, and the effects thereof. 
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keeping; rituals of memorialization and commemoration). As in the spatially carpentered 
environment, everyday practices in the temporally carpentered environment mediate 
ordinary and scientific understandings of the world, via such notions as natural 
recurrence and reproduction (cyclical time) vs. rational progress and technical growth 
(linear time) (Lefebvre 2008[2002], 231-2), and their tempos are a defining component of 
our social life-processes (Rosa 2013). They thereby also contribute to normalizing the 
political order, whose authority and symbolic violence operate through the constructed 
naturalness of temporal practices and representations and the hiddenness of their life-
regulating and consciousness-shaping/taming function (Bourdieu 2012).  
Of the other epistemologically relevant elements that compose the carpentry of 
everyday life – such as the auditory (Ihde 2007[1976]) or chromatic realms – the way the 
world is ‘populated’ and its various (human and non-human, organic and non-organic) 
populations connected is another important variable to consider. Such a focus includes 
classical sociological concerns for the effects of inter-human interaction as well as recent 
explorations of how our epistemic relation to the social and natural order is mediated and 
shaped by our interaction with technology and technologies of everyday and scientific 
activity (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015).  
These should be utilized in pursuing explanations of the emergence, evolution, 
and (de)stabilization of our ontologies as well as of our theoretical categories and 
instruments, such as the gradual depersonalization of the concept of ‘causality’ that 
accompanied the move from animal-aided human labor to mechanized technologies of 
production (Childe 1949, 22) or its grounding in the exchange interactions of the 
marketplace (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 54-56). By properly illuminating the social processes 
governing the mental processes of abstraction and ideation wherein philosophical 
categories and concepts originate, this approach would suggest very different starting-
points for IR scholars’ recurrent discussions of such issues as ‘causation’, wherein 
epistemological differences among schools of thought often distract from the meta-
epistemological consensus that unites them (e.g., most recently, the JIRD special issue on 
causation (Humphreys 2016)). 
This line of inquiry also intersects with a core theme in the sociology of 
knowledge, namely, the way distance and abstraction from the materiality of life institute 
theoretical and scholarly thinking as an alienated practice whose nature and grounding in 
social life-processes are masked to one’s immediate self-understanding. A praxiographic 
exploration of scholars’ immersion in environments characterized by different carpentries 
along a materiality-abstraction spectrum would help us determine how different praxical 
engagements with different world-forms shape the ontological and epistemological 
parameters of our scholarly worldview.  
However, only a comparison with the ontologies and epistemologies of other 
social groups can tell us what specifically distinguishes the skholè from other socially 
differentiated modes of engagement with, and immersion in, the world 
(Seinsverbundenheit). I propose that such an inquiry into the second pathway of social 
determination is best pursued by approaching IR knowledge as differentiated social 
labor. 
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Scholarly Thought as Social Labor: IR Epistemography through a Sociology of Craft 
 
To consider knowledge and thought as kinds of social practice is to problematize a series 
of classical philosophical distinctions and dichotomies, from Aristotle’s (2004) categories 
of theoria, poiesis, and praxis to Arendt’s (1998[1958]) opposition between the vita 
contemplativa and the vita activa. It further entails problematizing the second-level 
distinctions along which knowledge/thought and practice are themselves sub-divided on 
the basis of how theoretical or praxical/practical they, their means, or their ends are – e.g. 
the classical-Greek division of epistemic thought into logos, mythos, and metis, or the 
Arendtian division of praxis into ‘labor’, ‘work’, and ‘action’, itself based on the 
distinction between animal laborans and homo faber. 
To endorse these a priori philosophical categories as a starting-point for a 
naturalist investigation of scholarly knowledge as a type of social labor is to negate the 
inquiry before it has even started. But to ignore them altogether is to fail to interrogate 
and explain their socio-epistemic authority. The distinctiveness of a reflexive 
epistemology is indeed its ability to comprehend not only the origins of its own 
categories, but also what it means for theoretical thought to erase the possibility of 
interrogating the conditions of their possibility and credibility because it has erased the 
memory of its erasure of origins – e.g. philosophers’ forgotten erasure of metis as 
praxical knowing in favor of logos as the only, idealist paradigm of knowledge (Detienne 
and Vernant 1974) or their forgotten erasure of artists’ praxis-based ‘theory of art’ in 
favor of their own ‘aesthetics’ as an idealist ‘theory of beauty’ (Lichtenstein 2014).  
To understand, then, what distinguishes the skholè from other modes of 
engagement with the world, a working category is needed that avoids misleading a priori 
distinctions and simultaneously enables us to illuminate actual differences empirically. 
As distinctive from ‘everyday practices’ I turn to ‘craft’ as such a category encompassing 
those social practices that are constituted through the social differentiation and 
specialization of human labor. Because of its etymological root (kraft i.e. strength, 
power) and its genealogy spanning ‘skill’, ‘art’, and ‘science’, ‘craft’ conveys well the 
nature of labor as productive (creative) and reproductive, and of knowledge as 
theoretical, praxical, and practical. This is an alternative to the French ‘métier’ that might 
be even more appropriate here, since it means ‘profession’ and ‘competence’ but can also 
refer to the artisan’s instrument, such as a loom – the praxeological meta-epistemological  
significance of the latter connotation is precisely what is unfortunately lost in the 
translation of Bourdieu et al.’s (1968) Le métier de sociologue into The Craft (not of the 
sociologist, but) of Sociology (1991).  
Understood as socially differentiated expert practice, craft encompasses the whole 
spectrum of human specialized labor and can be mobilized to empirically explore the 
specificities of the skholè as one kind among others – one that tends to be located at the 
‘mental’ extreme of the mental-manual spectrum, and wherein the ‘intimate connection 
between hand and head’ (Sennett 2008) appears, or is claimed, to be dissolved to the 
benefit of the latter’s prominence. For the purpose of a comparative sociology of IR-
knowledge this spectrum should be critically interrogated by investigating the effect on 
epistemic representations of different variations of the involvement of ‘the hand’ and ‘the 
head’ (or, as discussed earlier, of engagement with materiality and abstraction) across 
different crafts.  
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One can pursue a narrow version of such a comparative inquiry by focusing on 
the craft of (IR) scholars: (IR) academics are differently located along the ‘mental-
manual’ spectrum typified by the simplistic division between ‘theoretical’ and 
‘experimental/empirical’ knowledge, and one merely needs to investigate how their 
different distance from their subject-matter and their different engagement with its 
concrete manifestations affect their conceptualizations, explanations, and other 
representations of it. The discussion of methodologies, usually subordinated to the 
discussion of epistemology, would thereby rather inform a bottom-up reconstruction of 
epistemological problems and standards for IR. Such an inquiry can converge with the 
study of scholars’ everyday practices to understand how the scholarly habitus that sustain 
the skholè are formed both before and after socialization into science, philosophy, and 
academia. 
It is, however, the lateral extension of the sociology of IR-knowledge beyond the 
skholè that promises the most insightful comparison. Here, the point would be to 
understand how variations in the involvement of ‘the hand’ and ‘the head’ across 
different crafts, and variations in the nature of laborers’ physical settings, materials, 
instruments, and techniques, as well as their relation to them, affect their epistemic 
relation to their subject-matter and to the world. This first entails critically interrogating 
such socio-politically constructed categories as ‘intellectuals’ and ‘craftsmen’, which are 
obstacles to sociological understanding.  
So-called ‘intellectuals’ are not the only social laborers for whom ‘mental labor’ 
and ‘theoretical knowledge’ are epistemically central, just as so-called ‘craftsmen’ are not 
the only ones for whom ‘manual labor’, ‘praxical knowledge’, and ‘practical knowledge’ 
are. In general terms, insofar as theoretical knowledge corresponds to a judgment made 
about the meaning of some object, phenomenon, claim, or event, every individual 
engages in everyday epistemic acts, and every such act is grounded in some more or less 
consistent, explicit, and conscious epistemology – a layman’s ‘theory’ of knowledge/truth 
as it were. This epistemology is merely differently formalized as it mainly transpires in 
everyday discourse, conversations, and arguments about the world, in the various 
(e)valuations that underscore everyday behavior in it, and in behavior itself.   
Similarly but more distinctively, every artisan and non-artisan craft, from 
medicine to legislation and from engineering to poetry, involves a set of ‘theoretical’ 
‘praxical’ and ‘practical’ knowledges whose underlying epistemology can be revealed 
through a praxiographic investigation of their epistemic ‘operating system’ – e.g. the 
‘metis of the artisan’ (Schwint 2002) or her ‘intelligent hand’ (Sennett 2008). The 
artificial opposition of ‘science’ and the ‘arts’ has consecrated the idea that such 
epistemic frameworks are substantially different from those with which epistemologists 
and philosophers of science are concerned – despite the role of artist-engineers and 
craftsmen in the constitution of modern science (Zilsel 2003; Valleriani 2010).  
This is related to, and exacerbated by, the fact that epistemology is predominantly 
conceived and pursued as a theory of propositional knowledge (Zagzebski 1999), focused 
on the meaning and validity of statements about the world. Because the epistemic corpus 
of the arts is ‘a “know-how” without discourse’ (de Certeau 1990[1980], 103) embodied 
in the operations and material cultures of technique, the practice-based epistemologies of 
artists and artisans remain invisible at best, unless they are narrativized into existence by 
a trained-philosopher-turned-craftsman (e.g. Crawford 2009) – and in the worst case, 
	   25 
transmuted into ‘theory’ through a scholastic hijacking by non-practitioner-philosophers. 
This perpetuates the tendency to evaluate the knowledges of ‘art’ from the perspective of 
‘science’. If one rather considers that homo sapiens has always necessarily been homo 
faber, and that ‘art’ is the meeting of ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ (Gingras 2005) along various 
epistemic and praxical pathways and through various physical configurations, bodily 
deployments, techniques, instruments, and materials, then one can reverse the prism of 
reference and ask (IR) scholars to interrogate the ‘art’ through which they speak of the 
world: What materials of the world do we craft through our labor? – Or are we artisans of 
representations through and through? 
 Such meta-epistemological investigations should be complemented by a 
praxiography of the transmission of IR qua craft, which would tell us more about our 
epistemic ideologies and their consequences than the close critique of IR scholars’ ideas. 
Academics rely heavily, and sometimes exclusively, on the textual medium to 
communicate their knowledges to others. This reflects the fact that most of what we 
‘know’ academically we know because we are told by others – in the idealist categories 
of foundationalist-analytical philosophy (Russell 1910-11) this ‘knowledge by 
description’, as opposed to ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, is our predominant, language-
mediated epistemology. The most striking aspect of this tendency is that even 
knowledges required for empirical research are incorporated into curricula through 
textual media: we are told, rather than shown, how to know and how to deploy research 
methods; we learn about methods instead of learning them; we teach them to students in 
the classroom, not in the ‘field’ of direct engagement with our object-world where 
epistemic ‘problems’ actually originate and crystallize as problems (Bloor 1976). Our 
idealist practice and our meta-epistemological idealism thereby recursively produce and 
naturalize each other. 
In other social realms of epistemic activity such idealism is still marginal. In 
artisanal crafts and in most skills of everyday life, apprenticeship and trial-and-error are 
the alternative model of learning and teaching: a form of transmission that leaves no 
systematic documentary trail and that needs to be observed, even experienced, to be 
captured and understood. Neither bakers, nor carpenters learn by consulting written texts, 
which doesn’t prevent them from gaining an expert ‘theoretical’ understanding even of 
the underlying scientific bases of their crafts. But philosophers’ outsider idealism has 
been creeping into such domains of praxis, from the Encyclopédie’s early attempts to 
‘represent’ praxical knowledges to contemporary beliefs that we can learn any skill by 
reading a self-help book about it – another manifestation of how ‘our culture [has] 
cancerize[d] vision’ (de Certeau 1990[1980], xlviii).  
And yet actual practice confirms that there is no real epistemic substitute for 
‘doing’: this, one can easily verify by merely trying-and-failing, but the point is to draw 
the consequences of the disjunction between an idealist understanding of thought and 
practice and a praxeological one. Praxeological epistemography is the response to the 
meta-epistemological implications of this disjunction. Its starting-point is the 
acknowledgment that insofar as it is intrinsically grounded in the erasure of practice as 
mediator and condition of all human knowledge, idealist philosophical-epistemology is 
not merely impotent as a ‘theory of’ such knowledge, but is fundamentally itself a major 
obstacle to knowing. 
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In a recent keynote address Nicholas Onuf (Forthcoming) urged us to reconnect 
with the ‘legacy of craft’ that IR ‘traded in…for the cult of theory subject to the methods 
of science’, and to seriously reflect on how the divorce of the ‘two cultures’ has affected 
our understanding and practice of our vocation as well as our ability to serve ‘the 
common good’. Approaching IR through a sociology of craft would first allow us to 
understand how different configurations of social labor – the most structured and 
structuring medium of our ‘existential boundedness’ – affect epistemic standpoints, and 
hence understand the specificity of our own. But insofar as we inhabit a common world 
upon whose objects IR scholars have no monopoly, a comparison of how our own 
subject-matter is perceived and lived by those whose labor is differently engaged in/with 
the world can also further illuminate the socio-historically and praxically situated 
grounding of our scholarly worldview, as well as its distinctive social value and worth.  
IR is now interested in how ‘the international’, ‘security’, ‘borders’, etc. are 
understood by ‘ordinary’ people that inhabit the world differently – diplomats, refugees, 
border security agents. This is an important investigation that should be pursued more 
systematically, i.e. explicitly and confidently advanced, against the snobbery of meta-
theorists, as an inquiry into ‘everyday epistemology’. But it needs to specifically focus on 
differentiated social labor. Without this, we cannot ground our own vocational 
epistemology in a properly reflexive understanding of the social determinants of our 
philosophy and science. And without that, we cannot fully enact our social role as a 
legitimate and responsible competitor in the social struggles for meaning, ‘truth’, and 
action.  
Indeed an idealized (e.g. Weberian) understanding of our ‘vocation’ based on 
analytical demarcations cannot illuminate (to us and others) the social history and hence 
the nature of the place from which we speak to the world about the world. And unless we 
ourselves understand what objectively creates our scholarly standpoint as a distinctive 
one (regardless of whether it is or not ‘superior’), we cannot successfully address the 
social reactions this standpoint provokes (such as recurrent attacks on our ‘expertise’) or 
navigate the social dilemmas and conflicts in which it engages us. It is in this sense that 
the pursuit of a better theory of (our) knowledge – a better epistemology – is 
paradoxically the shortest and most efficient way of addressing IR’s perennial questions 
about what we are practically ‘for’ (Brown 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first purpose of this paper was to draw attention to, and diagnose, the failure of IR’s 
‘sociological turn’ to extend the reach of sociological reason into the philosophical turf of 
epistemology. Its second purpose was to revive and deploy, in conceptually and 
empirically meaningful terms, the radical version of the sociology of knowledge that can 
achieve an autonomous reconstruction of epistemology suited to a post-Kantian 
consciousness. I hope to have adequately and coherently mapped the terrain from which 
such a reconstruction can be successfully pursued, thereby laying a solid basis for a 
future discussion of the actual methodologies and methods that serve such a project, as 
well as its preliminary results. In the meantime, some concluding remarks on its critical 
and reconstructive objectives might help further highlight its significance in the current 
‘global’ socio-intellectual context.  
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The sociology of knowledge was born in and of socio-intellectual transformations 
and crises similar to the globalized one(s) we are witnessing today – the rise, co-
existence, and violent competition of profoundly contradictory worldviews; the erosion 
of epistemic and socio-moral consensus; the destabilization of socio-epistemic authorities 
and the socio-normative orders they sustain. Its distinctive gaze, purpose, and instruments 
were forged in, and in response to, such critical transformations, with a belief that 
reflexivity enabled a lucid critique of contemporaneous paradigms of ‘truth’ without 
giving up on the possibility of an epistemically meaningful future.  
The sociology of knowledge, then, was the first critical engagement with ‘the 
politics of truth’ that triggered the ‘post-positivist turn’, and its proper revival can help us 
today face the politics of ‘untruth’ or ‘post-truth’ that now place ‘post-positivists’ in an 
uncomfortable socio-intellectual position. One should acknowledge the current malaise 
without necessarily endorsing the accusation that post-foundationalism’s critique of 
‘truth’, ‘facts’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘science’ is single-handedly responsible for the erosion 
of their social value. If we take seriously the notion that ‘ideas matter’ in the ‘social 
constitution’ of the social world, then we do have to honestly consider the actual socio-
academic impact of this critique, but also ask whether we have adequately equipped 
ourselves (and others) to face the full consequences of the loss of epistemic ‘foundations’ 
– especially our seeming inability to sustain a coherent social discourse on the validity of 
(social-)science’s own ‘truths’ when it finds itself under attack in the socio-political 
arena.  
For those who, two decades ago, entirely dismissed Alan Sokal’s warning about 
‘epistemic relativism’ and ‘deconstruction’7, Sokal’s revenge might bear only poisonous 
fruit – a reactionary return to an extreme positivism/scientism desperately brandished 
against the new dogmas of the age; a stubborn retreat into increasingly idealized postures 
of critique; or a frantic flight back into the pragmatics of political struggle. Neither of 
these positions – including Sokal’s – can coherently reconcile the social defense of ‘truth’ 
with a critical understanding of its social nature and its social conditions of possibility. 
Nor are all ‘post-positivisms’ capable of carrying such an important and urgent project – 
which theoretical positions on ‘truth’ and ‘science’ confidently and ‘critically’ expressed 
on the pages of IR journals are honestly compatible, and which are embarrassingly at 
odds, with the actual trust their authors place in the knowledges of the physicians, 
aeronautic engineers, and pharmacists that sustain their daily lives?  
If freed of its self-imposed limitations, a ‘social constructionism’ informed by a 
‘revolutionary’ sociology of knowledge can deliver a coherent, empowering, and morally 
responsible position on knowledge, truth, and science. This requires a more sophisticated 
and comprehensive formulation of the nature and processes of ‘social constitution’, but 
also a consideration of the proper nature and role of human ‘agency’ in such processes. 
Social-determination theorists remind us that while the world we engage is indeed one ‘of 
our own making’, it makes us back – and thereby constrains us – as well as the categories 
through which we perceive, value, and enact it. The sociology of knowledge is therefore 
also an invitation to acknowledge again, and reinstitute without inhibition, the specific 
criticality of the structuralist perspective, so that we might properly ‘locate [our] 
responsibilities where [our] freedoms really are’ (Bourdieu 1990b, 15). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Cf. the ‘science wars’ triggered by Sokal’s ‘hoax’ in Social Text and his critique of postmodernism and 
science studies (Sokal and Bricmont 1998). 
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